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SEPARATION OF POWERS
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1:
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress ....
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1:
The executive Power shall be vested in a President ....
N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1:
The legislative powers of this state shall be vested in the senate
and assembly.
N.Y. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1:
The executive power shall be vested in the governor ....
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
THIRD DEPARTMENT
Dorst v. Pataki'
(decided February 6, 1997)
In January of 1995, Governor Pataki issued an executive order
preventing prison inmates convicted of violent crimes from
participating in temporary release programs.2 Five inmates at
Albion Correctional Facility in Orleans County sought a
declaratory judgment3 to render the order unconstitutional.4
228 A.D.2d 4, 654 N.Y.S.2d 198 (3d Dep'Q, aftd, 90 N.Y.2d 696, 687
N.E.2d 1348, 665 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1997).
2 Id. at 5, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
3 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801 (McKinney 1997). This rule states that "[rielief
previously obtained by writ of certiorari to review, mandamus or prohibition
shall be obtained in a proceeding under this article." Id. The issues to be
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While the matter was proceeding, a state statute was amended to
allow the governor to exclude inmates from programs with such
orders.' Plaintiffs argued that this amendment violated the
separation of powers provided for by the Federal 6 and State7
Constitutions. 8  The trial court declared the executive order
unconstitutional, but the amendment constitutional,9 and the
Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed.1"
Soon after taking office, Governor Pataki issued Executive
Order No. 5." Since his administration had pledged to protect
the people of New York from violent felons, 2 he ordered the
determined under this action include "whether the body or officer
proceeded.., without or in excess of jurisdiction." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7803
(McKinney 1997).
4 Dorst, 228 A.D.2d at 5, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 199. Plaintiffs sought this
declaration on the grounds that the executive order contradicted the eligibility
requirements that the legislature had promulgated, thereby violating separation
of powers. Id.
5 Id. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 851 (McKinney 1997).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. This section provides in pertinent part that "[a]ll
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress . . . ." Id.
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President. . . ." U.S. CONST. art.
II, § i, cl. 1.
7 N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1. This section provides in pertinent part that
"[t]he legislative powers of this state shall be vested in the senate and
assembly." Id. "The executive power shall be vested in the governor ...."
N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 1. "He shall expedite all measures as may be
resolved upon by the legislature, and shall take care that the laws are faithfully
executed." N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
8 Dorst, 228 A.D.2d at 5, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
9 Id. at 5-6, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
10 Id. at 6-7, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
i1 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.5 (1995): This title provides
for: "Ordering that the Commissioner of the Department of Correctional
Services bar the transfer of certain inmates sentenced as violent Felony
Offenders to Temporary Release programs and residential Treatment
Facilities." Id. This order was revoked and superseded by Executive Order
No. 5.1, signed October 13, 1996. Id.
12 Id. "This administration has pledged to protect the personal freedoms of
innocent law-abiding citizens and eliminate temporary release for dangerous
felons. ... " Id. The Governor also stated that a violent felon who has "not
served his or her full sentence is a threat to public safety and welfare." Id.
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Commissioner of Correctional Services to enact or retract any
rule as necessary to:
prevent the future transfer to any temporary release
program or residential treatment facility of any inmate
sentenced as a violent felony offender convicted of a
crime involving the infliction of serious physical injury,
the use or threatened use of a dangerous instrument, or
the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon. 13
At the time of the order, temporary release programs were
governed by statute. 4 Plaintiffs had either been eligible for
temporary release, or had already been approved for it, but they
all became ineligible under the executive order. 5 Therefore, the
plaintiffs brought an Article 78 proceeding against that order. 6
While the action was in progress, Correction Law § 851(2) was
amended to allow the Governor to make such orders. 7 The
Orleans County Supreme Court converted the Article 78
proceeding into a declaratory judgment action and declared
Executive Order No. 5 unconstitutional, because it imposed
restrictions on temporary release programs that conflicted with
13 id.
14 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 851(2) (McKinney 1995). This statute states that
inmates eligible for temporary release who have been convicted of violent
crimes require written approval from the Commissioner of Correctional
Services in order to be admitted into temporary release programs. Id.
15 Dorst, 228 A.D.2d at 5, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
16 id.
11 1995 N.Y. Laws ch. 3, sec. 805, § 29 (1995). This amendment provided
that:
The governor, by executive order, may exclude or limit the
participation of any class of otherwise eligible inmates from
participation in a temporary release program. Nothing in this
paragraph shall be construed as to affect either the validity of
any executive order previously issued limiting the
participation of otherwise eligible inmates in such program or
the authority of the commissioner of the department of
correctional services to impose appropriate regulations
limiting such participation.
Id. See N.Y. CoRRECT. LAw 851(2) (McKinney 1997). This amendment
went into effect September 1, 1997. Id.
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the Legislature's eligibility requirements." However, it held the
amendment to Correction Law § 851(2) was a "constitutional
delegation of legislative authority to the Executive," and the
plaintiffs appealed that holding.' 9
In their arguments before the Appellate Division, Third
Department, plaintiffs asserted that the Legislature improperly
gave the executive branch the authority to remove eligible
inmates from the temporary release programs, thus violating the
separation of powers doctrine.Y The court rejected that claim
holding that neither the Federal Constitution nor the New York
State Constitution forbids delegating the power to administer the
laws of the Legislature as long as that administrative power is
limited by appropriate safeguards. 2' In reaching its holding, the
court relied on Levine v. Whalen'2 providing that delegation of
administrative discretion was not prohibited, so long as the
legislature appropriately limited that discretion.'
18 Dorst, 228 A.D.2d at 5-6, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
19 Id. at 6, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 199-200. Only three out of the five original
plaintiffs joined in the appeal, since two were already approved for temporary
release, and the invalidation of the executive order rendered their claims moot.
Id. at 6, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 200 n. 1.20 Id. at 6, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
21 Id.
22 39 N.Y.2d 510, 349 N.E.2d 820, 384 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1976).
23 Id. at 515, 349 N.E.2d at 822, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 723. Gerald Levine,
operator of the Westmere Convalescent Home was charged with violating the
state's Public Health Law. Id. at 514, 349 N.E.2d at 822, 384 N.Y.S.2d at
722-23. The State Commissioner of Health ordered the operating system to be
revoked, and for Levine to arrange for connection of a fire alarm system to the
home, inspection by the local fire department, and for everything necessary to
cease operations by the assigned date. Id. at 514, 349 N.E.2d at 822, 384
N.Y.S.2d at 723. On appeal, the Appellate Division declared the Public
Health statute in question to be unconstitutional because it delegated legislative
powers to the health department without adequate safeguards, and that the
regulations adopted were arbitrary and unreasonable. Id. at 515, 349 N.E.2d
at 822, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 723. The Court of Appeals held that the Legislature
may only assign discretion to an administrative organization when it limits the
area in which that discretion can operate, and provides limits to its use, as is
reasonable for the area in question. Id.
[Vol 141274
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In response, plaintiffs argued that the delegation in the instant
case contained no safeguards at all, and gave the Governor the
authority to exclude from temporary release programs any
inmates, for any reason.24 However, the Dorst court held that the
safeguards are part of the statutory scheme in question, citing to
Cavaioli v. Board of Trustees of S. U.N. Y.,25 which held that even
when a statute doesn't explicitly provide standards for the
administrative agency to abide by, sufficient standards may be
found in related statutes.' Likewise, the entire statutory scheme
of Article 26 of the Correction Law27 provides that determinations
for these programs shall be made with "consideration for the
safety of the community and the welfare of the inmate."'
Lastly, plaintiffs argued that such standards were too general,
and therefore unconstitutional. 29 The Dorst court also rejected
this contention, relying a previous Court of Appeals case.3" In
Boreali v. Axelrod,3 the Court of Appeals held that no matter
how facially broad a grant of authority is, an administrative
agency is forbidden to use its power to enact its own laws to
24 Dorst, 228 A.D.2d at 6, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
2 116 A.D.2d 689, 498 N.Y.S.2d 7 (2d Dep't 1986).
26 Id. at 689, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 8. Employees of the S.U.N.Y. College at
Farmingdale challenged a statute that gave the S.U.N.Y. trustees the right to
determine salary schedules for employees, and the trustees used the schedule to
differentiate employees at two-year schools from those at four-year schools.
Id. The Appellate Division, Second Department, held that even though EDUC.
LAW § 355-a didn't provide salary determination standards for the trustees to
conform to, sufficient standards for that purpose could be found in EDUC. LAW
§§ 354 and 355. Id. Therefore, the delegation was constitutional. Id.
27 Dorst, 228 A.D.2d at 6, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 200. The article is titled
Temporary Release Programs For State Correctional Institutions. N.Y.
CORRECT. LAW §§ 851-61 (McKinney 1995).
SCoRREcr. LAw § 852(1) (McKinney 1995).
29 Dorst, 228 A.D.2d at 6, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
31 Id. See Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 1, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 523
N.Y.S.2d 464 (1987).
31 Id. The Public Health Council was held to have overstepped its authority
when it issued its own code that regulated smoking in public places. Id. at 6,
517 N.E.2d at 1351, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 466. The council weighed the concerns
of smokers and non-smokers, and reached its own conclusions and
compromises without legislative approval. Id.
1998 1275
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correct any evils it perceives,32 but it could not say that the
"broad enabling statute" was an unconstitutional delegation per
se.
33
The Court of Appeals came to a similar conclusion in Sullivan
County Harness Racing Association v. Glasser,34 where the
Legislature granted broad powers to the State Harness Racing
commission, including the power to issue licenses for any
condition the commission felt was necessary.35  The Court of
Appeals held that there was no constitutional violation, since the
commission could only issue the licenses when it determined it to
be necessary, or in the public's interest.36
Under the Federal Constitution, the state has the authority to
decide whether the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of
32 Id. at 9, 517 N.E.2d at 1353, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
33 Id. Nevertheless, the court held that the agency stretched the statute in
question beyond its intended reach when the agency used it to write a code that
embodied its own vision of public policy. Id. The court also cited to Levine
v. Whalen, 39 N.Y.2d 510, 349 N.E.2d 820, 384 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1976), as
authority that the Legislature cannot delegate its law-making duties to other
branches of government, but it can delegate power to administrative agencies,
with appropriate safeguards. Id. at 10, 517 N.E.2d at 1354, 523 N.Y.S.2d at
468-69. However, it still held that the actions taken, even though they were
intended to find "the proper balance among health concerns," served the
legislative function. Id. at 12, 517 N.E.2d at 1355, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
The dissent argued that the actions were well within the authority of the Public
Health Council, since the Legislature had reserved this area for this agency 75
years before. Id. at 16, 517 N.E.2d at 1358, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 473 (Bellacosa,
J., dissenting). Since the Legislature could not have predicted the need for
regulation in many areas, it was wise to grant flexible authority to the agency
that was expert in this field so it could enact the needed regulations, "free
from the sometimes paralyzing polemics associated with the legislative
process." Id. at 17-18, 517 N.E.2d at 1359, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 473 (Bellacosa,
J., dissenting).
34 30 N.Y.2d 259, 283 N.E.2d 603, 332 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1972). The State
Harness Racing Commission, under the authority granted by statute,
conditioned a racing license to Sullivan County as long as they were not
televised. Id. at 275, 283 N.E.2d at 605-06, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 625.351 Id. at 276, 283 N.E.2d at 606, 332 N.Y.S.2d 626.36 Id. at 277, 283 N.E.2d at 606-07, 332 N.Y.S.2d 626. The court therefore
held that the Legislative grant to the Commission of "very broad power" was
proper. Id. at 277, 283 N.E.2d at 607, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
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its own government should be kept entirely separate, or may be
delegated as it sees fit.37 If a state decides to blend the powers of
different departments in the same officials, it does not violate the
constitutional guarantee that every state shall have a republican
government. 38  Under the New York State Constitution, the
borderlines of the three branches are not definitely drawn, so
separation of powers is not absolute, and cannot always be rigidly
applied. 39 An executive agency cannot create legislation, but it
tends to be difficult to draw the line that separates legislative
power from administrative power to enact regulations.4"
Extending this uncertain area to the instant matter, the
Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the lower court's
decision in holding that the amendment to Correction Law §
851(2) was a constitutionally legitimate delegation of power to the
executive branch.41 While the area is admittedly hazy, the
legislative branch has never been prohibited from delegating
authority to the executive branch to administer the Legislature's
laws.42 The Legislature is only required to institute proper limits
and safeguards on the authority it delegates to the executive
branch or administrative agency,43 and those safeguards need not
be specific to be upheld as constitutional.' The original order,
Executive Order No. 5,45 was declared unconstitutional because it
directly contravened a state statute.46  However, once the
Legislature amended that statute to allow for such orders,47 the
Governor was then granted constitutionally permissible authority
to issue such orders as long as they were consistent with the law
3,20 N.Y. JuR. 2D Constitutional La § 154.
38 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. "The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Goverment .... " Id.
3120 N.Y. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 153.
40 20 N.Y. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 157.
41 Dorst v. Pataki, 228 A.D.2d 4, 6-7, 654 N.Y.S.2d 198, 200 (3d Dep't
1997).42 Id. at 6, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
43Id.
AId.
45 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & PEGS. tit. 9, § 5.5 (1995).
46 Dorst, 228 A.D.2d at 6, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
47 N.Y. CoRRECr. LAW 851(2) (McKinney 1997).
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enacted. 48 Thus, the Governor reinstated his order in Executive
Order No. 5. 1,49 since the amendment was deemed
constitutional. 0
Therefore, New York courts have taken a more functional than
literalist approach to separation of powers cases. The New York
courts seem to be adopting the holding of Mistretta v. United
States,51 which allowed Congress to delegate authority to the
other two branches of the federal government, because the
legislature cannot realistically be expected to provide for
everything themselves. 2 Also, the courts are adopting the federal
requirement that the Legislature simply provide clear guidelines,
that prevent its delegation from exceeding certain boundaries."
Additionally, New York courts are permitting the legislative
branch to continue its domain over primary lawmaking duties by
correcting any defects in their own legislation by amendment. In
this instance, the Legislature specifically gave the governor
authority to exclude eligible inmates from temporary release
programs, using only his vested executive powers to implement
that exclusion.4 Therefore, the delegation was permissible.5
41 See Dorst, 228 A.D.2d at 6, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
49 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.5 (1995).
' See Dorst, 228 A.D.2d at 6-7, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
51 488 U.S. 361 (1989). Congress had created a Sentencing Commission as
"an independent commission in the judicial branch" to promulgate guidelines
for sentences for certain federal crimes. Id. at 362-68. The Court held that
the Commission did not violate separation of powers, and was not granted
"excessive legislation discretion." Id. at 371.
52 Id. at 372. In our complex society, Congress cannot fulfill its obligations
without delegating its power. Id. Congress cannot generally assign its
lawmaking power to either of the other two branches. Id. However, the
nondelegation doctrine does not prevent Congress from procuring the
assistance of those branches, so long as it lays down the specific objective that
the delegation is to achieve, and sets the boundaries that the body authorized to
exercise that authority must stay within. Id.
53 Id. at 374.
54 Dorst, 228 A.D.2d at 6, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
55 Id. at 6-7, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
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